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State ex rel. Von Hoffman Press, Inc. v. Saitz (Von Hoffman Press I)'
State ex rel. Von Hoffman Press, Inc. v. Saitz (Von Hoffman Press II)2
In two decisions likely to inspire further litigation, the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Eastern District removed two apparent barriers to
discovery of confidential state documents. These cases have extensive
policy implications. They support an inference that few statutes prohibit-
ing disclosure of information obtained by the state will be interpreted to
limit discovery in a judicial proceeding.
The underlying controversy commenced in 1976 when a use tax assess-
ment of $60,000 was levied against plaintiff Von Hoffman Press, Inc.
Seeking to annul the assessment, the plaintiff filed suit against the Director
of Revenue, claiming the tax should have been collected from twenty-
three "out-of-state" vendors from which it purchased merchandise. These
companies, plaintiff urged, had sufficient contact with the state to trigger
sales tax liability on the merchandise and exonerate plaintiff from the use
tax.
In preparation for trial, the plaintiff served notice on the Director of
Revenue, requesting that he appear for deposition with all sales, use, cor-
porate, partnership, individual, and franchise tax returns filed by the
twenty-three companies during the assessment period. At the same time, a
subpoena was served on the Director of Employment Security command-
ing him to appear and produce all employment experience reports and all
reports showing contributions to the unemployment compensation fund
filed for each of the companies during the assessment years. The plaintiff
maintained that these reports and returns would show the extent and
nature of the companies' business activities in Missouri s and "tend to
establish that ... they should be paying a sales tax rather than ... [plain-
tiff] paying a use tax."'4
The Director of Revenue and the Director of Employment Security
moved to quash the notice and subpoeria. Each claimed he was prohibited
1. 604 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
2. 607 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
3. Brief for Relators at 9, 607 S.W.2d 219.
4. Suggestions in Opposition to Special Appearance and Motion to Quash
Subpoena to Produce Documents of the Director of the Missouri Division of
Employment Security at 1-2, Von Hoffman Press, Inc. v. Burris, No. 391317
(Cir. Ct., St. L. Cty., Mo., filed Feb. 9, 1977).
[Vol. 46844
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by statute from disclosing the requested information. Under Missouri
Revised Statutes section 32.057, 5 it is a felony for the Director of Revenue
to divulge information relative to any report or return filed with the
Department of Revenue, except, inter alia, when the information is
"directly involved" in a proceeding under Missouri revenue laws. As this
statute was interpreted by the director, the only tax returns directly in-
volved in a revenue proceeding are those filed by a party to the proceeding.
Missouri Revised Statutes section 288.2506 provides, with certain excep-
tions, that information filed with the Division of Employment Security is
confidential and privileged. The Director of Employment Security con-
tended that disclosure to a private party in a suit unrelated to the employ-
ment security laws is not included in any exception enumerated in the
statute. Both directors' motions were sustained by the trial court, but the
plaintiff petitioned for alternative writs of mandamus. In Von Hoffman
Press I and Von Hoffman Press II, the eastern district court of appeals
agreed with the plaintiff. In each case, it was held that the trial court's ac-
tion exceeded its jurisdiction and that production of the documents must
be compelled. 7
At minimum, these decisions represent a slight, practical expansion in
the scope of Missouri discovery. In a proceeding under the revenue laws of
this state, Missouri Revised Statutes section 32.0578 does not bar discovery
from the Department of Revenue of tax returns filed by nonparties. 9
Likewise, Missouri Revised Statutes section 288.25010 does not prohibit
production of information filed with the Division of Employment Security
if the information is relevent to a proceeding in which the Director of
Revenue is a party.11
5. (Cum. Supp. 1980). Plaintiff contended the case should have been
decided under RSMO § 32.057.2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980) because the underlying
case, Von Hoffman Press, Inc. v. Burris, No. 391317 (Cir. Ct., St. L. Cty., Mo.,
filed Feb. 9, 1977), essentially was an action to enforce the revenue laws. Brief for
Relators at 11, 607 S.W.2d 219. In the alternative, plaintiff argued that produc-
tion should be compelled under RSMO § 32.057.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980) because
the requested documents are "directly involved" in an action under the revenue
laws. Brief for Relators at 12, 607 S.W.2d 219. The court declined to apply
subsection 2(b) to the facts of this case, but awarded discovery under subsection
2(c). 607 S.W.2d at 222-23.
6. (Cum. Supp. 1980). It is not clear from the Von Hoffman I opinion
which version of this statute was applied. The court cited RSMO § 288.250 (1969)
but quoted id. (Cum. Supp. 1980). See 604 S.W.2d at 772 n.1. RSMO § 288.250
(1978) was in effect when production of the documents was refused, but id.
(Cum. Supp. 1980) was effective when the alternative writ was made peremptory.
The difference between the two versions is not relevant to this case.
7. 607 S.W.2d at 220; 604 S.W.2d at 772, 773.
8. (Cum. Supp. 1980).
9. 607 S.W.2d at 222-23.
10. (Cum. Supp. 1980).
11. 604S.W.2d at 772, 773.
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The Von Hoffman Press decisions are also consistent with a broader
view. They reiterate the conclusion reached in early Missouri cases that
public policies underlying state confidentiality statutes do not justify
withholding information from judicial proceedings.12 Almost certainly,
these cases will be used to attack other statutes. Before they are accepted as
modem precedent, however, a note of caution is in order. The Von Hoff-
man Press opinions do not point out that modem rules of civil procedure
impel a balancing of policy interests that was unnecessary in the past.
When a party to a civil suit seeks discovery of confidential documents
from the state, two important policies conflict. On one hand, there is a
vital public interest in promoting exact and evenhanded administration of
justice. This interest is furthered by allowing the broadest possible scope of
discovery consistent with the notion of reasonable search and seizure.' 3
12. See State ex rel. Ross v. Sevier, 334 Mo. 977, 984, 69 S.W.2d 662, 665
(1934); In re French, 315 Mo. 75, 84, 285 S.W. 513, 516 (En Banc 1926); In re
Millspaugh, 307 Mo. 185, 193, 270 S.W. 110, 112 (En Banc 1925); Jones v. Gian-
nola, 252 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Mo. App., St. L. 1952).
13. Missouri courts often have indicated that compulsory production of in-
formation that is irrelevant or immaterial to a suit can constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of Mo. CONST. art. I, § 15. See State ex rel. Cum-
mings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 1092-93, 219 S.W.2d 383, 386 (En Banc 1949);
State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 679-80, 203
S.W.2d 407, 409-10 (En Banc 1947); State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward,
351 Mo. 761, 766, 173 S.W.2d 920, 921-22 (En Banc 1943); State ex rel. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 111, 119-20, 171 S.W.2d 569, 574 (1943);
State ex rel. Mo. Broadcasting Co. v. O'Malley, 344 Mo. 639, 644, 127 S.W.2d
684, 685-86 (En Banc 1939); State ex rel. Schlueter Mfg. Co. v. Beck, 337 Mo.
839, 851-52, 85 S.W.2d 1026, 1032 (En Banc 1935); State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. Ry. v. Wood, 316 Mo. 1032, 1039, 292 S.W. 1033, 1035-36 (En Banc 1927);
State ex rel. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Trimble, 254 Mo. 542, 557-58, 163 S.W.
860, 863-64 (En Banc 1914). When these decisions were rendered, however, the
only information considered relevant and material to a suit was information that
was admissible in evidence. See note 45 infra. In 1960, the scope of discovery in
Missouri was expanded considerably, and MO. R. CIV. P. 56.01 now allows
discovery not only of admissible evidence but also of information reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Presumably, a court
order commanding production of information not relevant to determination of a
suit but likely to lead to discovery of admissible evidence would not be held to con-
stitute an unreasonable search or seizure. The cases suggest, however, that there
is a point at which valid constitutional objections to discovery orders might still be
raised. The ripest case for testing in this area is one in which production of a
document or tangible item, such as a computer tape, is requested, and only a
small portion of the document or item contains admissible evidence or informa-
tion reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Under
current Missouri rules, once a document or tangible thing has been requested or
subpoenaed, limitations on discovery are entirely within the discretion of the trial
court. MO. R. CIv. P. 56.01, 57.09, 58.01. The cases cited above, however, and
the more recent decisions in State ex rel. Isbell v. Kelso, 442 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.
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State policy favoring liberal discovery is codified in Missouri Rules of Civil
Procedure 56.01, which generally grants civil litigants access to any infor-
mation, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of a suit.
On the other hand, there is a strong public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of certain state documents. Many important state pro-
grams, such as the collection of revenue, protection of children from
abuse, supervision of health care, and industry regulation, depend, for
their effectiveness, on ready and full disclosure of personal information to
the state. If no restrictions are placed on public access to this information,
invasion of privacy may result from full compliance with the law. By
minimizing this undesirable effect, confidentiality statutes encourage full
and voluntary participation, which is essential to the effectiveness of many
programs.1 4 State confidentiality statutes also further the public interest in
minimizing state intrusion into the private lives of its citizens. These prin-
ciples underlie more than thirty-five Missouri statutes that restrict
disclosure of information acquired by the state. 15
App., Spr. 1969) and State ex rel. Woods v. Kirkwood, 426 S.W.2d 690 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1968) indicate that there may be occasions when MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 15 requires a protective order limiting discovery to that part of the document or
item that is pertinent to the case.
14. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2377, at 780 (rev. 1961 & Supp. 1981).
15. A number of statutes expressly permit state officers to disclose otherwise
confidential information on court order. RSMO § 115.493 (1978) (voted ballots
and other election materials); id. § 193.240 (illegitimacy); id. § 193.250 (original
birth certificate after adoption); id. § 193.260 (original birth certificate after
legitimation); id. § 198.032 (Gum. Supp. 1980) (personal records of convales-
cent, nursing, and boarding home residents); id. § 276.551 (applications and
reports filed and inspections permitted under grain dealers law); id. § 351.665
(1978) (statements of corporate assets and liabilities); id. § 453.120 (files and
records of court in adoption proceedings).
A greater number permit disclosure only when it furthers a specific purpose
for which the information was acquired. Id. § 32.057 (Gum. Supp. 1980) (returns
and reports filed with the Department of Revenue); id. § 58.449 (1978) (results of
alcohol and drug tests conducted on deceased drivers by coroner); id. § 188.055
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (information obtained from abortion patients); id. § 189.085
(1978) (records concerning applications by and recipients of local health
services); id. § 201.120 (treatment records maintained by crippled children's ser-
vice); id. § 208.120 (information concerning applicants for and recipients of
public assistance) (but see notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra); id. §
208.155 (information concerning applicants for and recipients of medical
assistance); id. § 210.150 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (reports of and records concerning
child abuse and neglect); id. § 276.615 (1978) (sales records of livestock dealers
obtained by state veterinarian); id. § 285.015 (lists of employees furnished to
municipal corporations for purpose of city earnings tax); id. § 288.250 (Gum.
Supp. 1980) (information obtained by Division of Employment Security) (but see
Von Hoffman Press I); id. § 549.151 (1978) (information obtained by probation
and parole officers).
A few statutes place the decision whether to disclose largely within the discre-
1981]
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The Von Hoffman Press controversy is not the first occasion on which
the public policy favoring production of information in judicial pro-
ceedings and the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of cer-
tion of a state administrator. Id. § 219.061 (information about children main-
tained by Division of Youth Services); id. § 276.551 (Gum. Supp. 1980) (applica-
tions and reports filed and inspections permitted under grain dealers law); id. §
287.380 (accidents, injuries, and deaths reported by employers to Division of
Workers' Compensation); id. § 820.235 (1978) (records kept by state fire marshal);
id. § 335.091 (information obtained about licensees by state board of nursing);
id. § 411.180 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (information obtained during inspections of
grain warehouse books and records).
A number of statutes provide, without further explanation, that certain infor-
mation is to be closed, kept confidential, or not to be disclosed or made public.
Id. § 192.450 (1978) (data obtained from registration, inspection, and investiga-
tion of radiation sources); id. § 201.120 (treatment records maintained by crip-
pled children's service); id. § 210.040 (optional blood test of pregnant women for
syphilis); id. § 383.115 (1978) (reports of malpractice claims against Missouri in-
sureds); id. § 386.480 (information furnished to public service commission); id. §
444.820 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (certain information submitted with application for
surface coal mining permit); id. § 444.825 (portions of surface mine reclamation
plans); id. § 610.100 (1978) (arrest records when no charge is filed within 30
days); id. § 610.105 (arrest records when case is nolle prossed, dismissed, or ac-
cused is found not guilty).
Id. § 610.025 provides that certain records may be closed: records of judge
and jury deliberations and grand jury meetings; records of juvenile court, adop-
tion, illegitimacy, and probation and parole proceedings; records pertaining to
litigation and certain real estate transactions involving governmental bodies;
records of the state militia and national guard; records of nonjudicial mental
health proceedings; records of proceedings involving physical health; records
regarding scholastic probation, expulsion, and graduation; records of welfare
cases; and records relating to the hiring, firing, and promotion of government
personnel.
Six statutes limit disclosure of information which would not be admissible
evidence in a pending action. Id. § 148.100 (reports filed with the Division of
Finance by banking institutions); id. § 148.200 (reports filed with the Division of
Finance by credit institutions); id. § 335.091 (information obtained about
licensees by state board of nursing); id. § 351.665 (information obtained from ex-
amination of corporate books and records by Secretary of State); id. § 355.485
(answers to interrogatories issued to corporations by Secretary of State); id. §
361.080 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (information obtained by Director of Division of
Finpnce concerning banks, trust companies, and small loan businesses).
Finally, there are miscellaneous statutes that limit access to information in
state custody. Id. § 195.290 (1978) (drug offense records); id. § 195.540 (results of
narcotics addiction tests not usable against patient in criminal proceedings); id. §
211.321 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (juvenile court records and records of peace officers
concerning children under 17 disclosed on order of juvenile court); 1980 Mo.
Laws 623 (to be codified at RSMO § 260.430) (trade secrets discovered during
hazardous waste management program not available to public); RSMo § 610.100
(1978) (arrest records).
5
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tain documents have competed for judicial favor. In 1923, state law pro-
hibited the Commissioner of Finance from disclosing information obtained
in bank examinations, except "when... called as a witness in any criminal
proceedings or trial in a court of justice."'1 6 The commissioner believed
that this statute prohibited disclosure in all but criminal proceedings. He
refused to provide evidence in a civil suit and was jailed for contempt. In In
re Millspaugh,'7 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the commissioner's
sentence, reasoning that "[t]he purpose of the law . . . [is] not to hide
legitimate evidence when the same is required by the courts in the disposi-
tion of even and exact justice as between litigants.""'
Legislative response to this decision was immediate. Less than two
months after Millspaugh was decided, the statute was amended to prohibit
disclosure "except when ... [the commissioner] is called on as a witness in
any criminal proceedings or criminal trial .... "19 Confronted in In re
French20 with this unequivocal manifestation of legislative intent, the
Missouri Supreme Court struck down the enactment as contrary to article
II, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution of 1875.21 This section provided
that "[t]he courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character ....
If a litigant in a civil case is forbidden by statute to obtain evidence, the
court ruled, then the power of the judiciary is impaired and a certain
remedy is not afforded. 23 The court suggested that in an appropriate case
nondisclosure might be justified on grounds of public policy, but found
that no such justification appeared in French .24
16. 1923 Mo. Laws 222, § 11679.
17. 307 Mo. 185, 270 S.W. 110 (En Banc 1925).
18. Id. at 193, 270 S.W. at 112.
19. 1925 Mo. Laws 230, § 11679 (emphasis added).
20. 315 Mo. 75, 285 S.W. 513 (En Banc 1926).
21. Now Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
22. 315 Mo. at 83-84, 285 S.W. at 515-16. In In re French, 1925 Mo. Laws
230, § 11679 also was invalidated as a violation of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
which forbids any state to make or enforce any law which denies the equal protec-
tion of the laws, and MO. CONST. art. IV, § 53 (1875) (now Mo. CONST. art. III, §
40), which prohibited the General Assembly from passing any local or special law
"granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive
right, privilege or immunity." 315 Mo. at 81, 285 S.W. at 514. Section 11679 per-
mitted the Commissioner of Finance to disclose information obtained from bank
examinations to the federal reserve board and federal reserve banks, to the
United States Comptroller of the Currency and his examiners, and to clearing-
houses of the State of Missouri and their examiners. The court found there was no
rational distinction between the federal reserve banks, boards, and state clearing-
houses that were allowed access to state bank examination reports and other debt-
ors, creditors, and interested persons who were not. Id. at 81-83, 285 S.W. at
514-15.
23. 315 Mo. at 83, 285 S.W. at 515.
24. Id. at 84, 285 S.W. at 516.
1981] 849
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Eight years later, the likelihood that nondisclosure would be upheld on
grounds of public policy diminished. At that time, the Commissioner of
Securities was authorized by law to place in a confidential file "not open to
the public any information which he deems in justice ... should not be
made public." 25 On the basis of this statute, the commissioner refused to
comply with a court order directing him to allow the plaintiff in a suit to
copy relevant documents. In State ex rel. Ross v. Sevier,26 the Missouri
Supreme Court ruled that although the public interest in promoting ac-
quisition of full information by the state may justify keeping certain
documents "from the prying eyes and hands of the general public," it does
not justify placing evidence beyond the reach of the court. 27 In fact, the
court added, any statute empowering the commissioner to keep evidence
from a judicial proceeding would be vulnerable to the same constitutional
attack that succeeded in In re French.2 8
In Jones v. Giannola,29 the plaintiff brought an action to recover
$1,400 she allegedly placed with the defendant for safekeeping. The
defendant countered that the plaintiffs claim was a "figment of the im-
agination"; she had no such sum, but was, in fact, poor and had been
receiving old age assistance for years. To support his allegations, the
defendant caused a subpoena duces tecum to be served on the director of
the local welfare office, commanding him to bring to court all welfare
records pertaining to the plaintiff. At trial, the court refused to permit the
director to testify, ruling that any testimony he might give could subject
him to a misdemeanor prosecution. At that time, Missouri Revised
Statutes section 208.12030 made it unlawful for a state employee to "make
known in any manner whatever to any person any information.., relative
to the identity of. . . recipients of old age assistance or the amount of
assistance any recipient receives," except in certain public assistance pro-
ceedings. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment on procedural grounds, 3' but admonished that while the statute for-
bids voluntary disclosures, it does not forbid disclosure of the contents of
official old age assistance files in response to a subpoena duces tecum
where the contents of the files are pertinent to a judicial inquiry. 32
25. RSMo § 7739 (1929).
26. 334 Mo. 977, 69 S.W.2d 662 (1934).
27. Id. at 983-84, 69 S.W.2d at 665.
28. Id.
29. 252 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. App., St. L. 1952).
30. (1949).
31. 252 S.W.2d at 663.
32. Id. The court ruled that although the reason given by the trial court for
excluding the records from evidence was incorrect, the error was not prejudicial
because defendant had failed to show the contents of the records would be perti-
nent to the litigation. Id. The court offered its interpretation of the statute in dic-
tum, but clearly indicated that had a proper offer of proof been made, the statute
would not have barred production of old age assistance records. After the Jones
decision, § 208.120 was amended to provide, "In any judicial proceedings, except
[Vol. 46850
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The only deviation in this line of cases is the 1977 Kansas City Court of
Appeals decision in State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson.3 3 The case involved a
claim against a decedent's insurer by the beneficiary of an accidental
death policy. Before trial, the plaintiff and the defendant joined in caus-
ing subpoenas duces tecum to be served on the county coroner and Director
of the Division of Highway Safety. The subpoenas commanded production
of the results of a blood test performed on the decedent by the coroner and
fowarded to the division. The coroner and director refused to comply,
citing Missouri Revised Statutes section 58.449. 34 This statute provides
that the results of such tests "shall be used only for statistical purposes." In
Donelson, the court declined to enforce the subpoenas, stating, "By use of
the word 'only' the legislature has limited the use of the report and test
results for statistical purposes solely, exclusively and for nothing else or
more.... It inevitably follows that such report and test results cannot be
made available to litigants or anyone else."'35
Although none of these prior cases is mentioned in either Von Hoff-
man Press opinion, both decisions echo the Millspaugh, French, Ross, and
Jones opinions issued many years before.
In Von Hoffman Press I, the decision to compel production of employ-
ment security documents rested on three gounds: (1) employment security
information is not absolutely privileged; inspection by public employees,
claimants, employing units, authorized representatives, and certain not-
for-profit agencies is permitted; (2) the plaintiff did not intend to use the
information for purposes of subverting the employment security laws; and
(3) the court did not see how use of the information would affect honesty in
reporting to the state.3 6
such proceedings as are directly concerned with the administration of these pro-
grams, such information... [relating to applicants for and recipients of public
assistance] shall be confidential and not admissible in evidence." RSMo §
20S,120.1 (1978). In light of Millspaugh and French, the validity of this amend-
ment is uncertain.
33. 557 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
34. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
35. 557 S.W.2d at 710.
36. 604 S.W.2d at 772. These arguments notwithstanding, RSMO § 288.250
(Cum. Supp. 1980) does not appear to permit disclosure of employment security
information to a private party in a suit unrelated to employment security laws.
The statute provides that information obtained by the division of employment
security from employing units shall be kept confidential and shall not be open to
public inspection, except to public employees in the performance of their public
duties, to claimants and employing units to the extent necessary for proper
presentation of employment compensation claims and employer liability protests,
and to authorized representatives of employing units on certain occasions. Id.
concludes with the provision, "Any information obtained by the division in the
administration of this law shall be privileged .... "The court did not explain its
finding in terms of statutory language or legislative intent, so clarification of the
theory underlying this decision must await future litigation.
8
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In Von Hoffman Press II, the court was similarly unswayed by the
argument that complete confidentiality is necessary to secure truthful
disclosure of information to the state.3 7 The primary purpose of Missouri
Revised Statutes section 32.057,38 according to the court, is to prevent vol-
untary disclosure of confidential information, not to prohibit production
of necessary records in judicial proceedings. 3 9 Construing the statute so
that "legitimate judicial inquiry is not limited," the court held that section
32.057 does not bar discovery from the Department of Revenue of
documents that are relevant to a proceeding under state revenue laws. 40
With the exception of Donelson, Missouri cases evidence a single
theme. Statutes restricting access to information in possession of the state
have not been allowed to impede production of evidence in judicial pro-
ceedings.41 When possible, statutory language has been interpreted to per-
37. "[D]ishonesty is more directly deterred by the penalty provision ...
making violations of the law requiring returns a misdemeanor." 607 S.W.2d at
222.
38. (Gum. Supp. 1980).
39. 607 S.W.2d at 222.
40. Id. at 222-23.
41. Von Hoffman Press II; Von Hoffman Press I; State ex rel. Ross v.
Sevier, 334 Mo. 977, 69 S.W.2d 662 (1934); In re French, 315 Mo. 75, 285 S.W.
513 (En Banc 1926); In re Millspaugh, 307 Mo. 186, 270 S.W. 110 (En Banc
1925). While public policies underlying state confidentiality statutes rarely have
been deemed to justify withholding evidence from judicial proceedings, they havejustified indefinite sequestration of information from public inspection. RSMO §
610.025 (1978) provides that records relating to the firing of a governmental body
employee may be "closed" at the discretion of the governmental body. The statute
is silent, however, on how long these records are to remain closed. In Wilson v.
McNeal, 575 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978), the plaintiff contended that a
report compiled by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department during an in-
vestigation into the death of her husband while he was in police custody should
have been made public after the case was concluded and no disciplinary action
was planned. In denying the plaintiffs petition, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
(which included Judge Dowd, who authored Von Hoffman Press I, and Judge
Snyder, who authored Von Hoffman Press II) declared:
If the purpose of the exemption is to permit candid, open and confiden-
tial discussion of personnel matters within a public governmental body,
the purpose is defeated if members and informants know that, although
the initial discussion and any record made are confidential, they are im-
mediately open to the press and public once a decision i made or a vote
taken....
Disclosure of the report would inhibit officers and citizens from
divulging information in the future....
Meetings, records or votes closed as authorized under § 610.025(4)
may remain closed indefinitely at the discretion of the supervising public
governmental body.
575 S.W.2d at 811. The Von Hoffman Press decisions indicate that the plaintiff
might have had more success if she had filed an action against the Board of Police
Commissioners and requested discovery of the document.
852 [Vol. 46
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mit disclosure. 42 With less flexible wording, courts have concluded that
the legislature intended to prohibit only voluntary disclosure. 43 In the ex-
treme case of an unequivocal statutory ban, the Missouri Supreme Court
has indicated it will invoke the constitution to obtain evidence. 44
Underlying all of these decisions is a determination that benefits ob-
tained by compelling production of confidential documents in judicial
proceedings outweigh any detrimental effects disclosure might have on
personal privacy or honest reporting to the state. While this value judg-
ment may have adequately reflected public priorities when Millspaugh,
French, Ross, andJones were decided, it needs refinement today.
Until 1960, no document was discoverable in Missouri unless it con-
tained admissible evidence. 45 Discovery was not authorized without a court
42. Von Hoffman Press II, 607 S.W.2d at 221-22; In re Millspaugh, 307
Mo. 185, 193, 270 S.W. 110, 112 (En Banc 1925).
43. Jones v. Giannola, 252 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Mo. App., St. L. 1952) (dic-
tum); State ex rel. Ross v. Sevier, 334 Mo. 977, 983-84, 69 S.W.2d 662, 665
(1934). This theory also may explain the Von Hoffman Press I decision. See note
36 supra.
44. State ex rel. Ross v. Sevier, 334 Mo. 977, 983-84, 69 S.W.2d 662, 665
(1934) (dictum); In re French, 315 Mo. 75, 81-84, 285 S.W. 513, 514-16 (En Banc
1926).
45. Courts may order parties to produce books or writings in their possession
or power containing evidence. RSMO § 510.030 (1959) (on good cause shown); id.
§ 510.030 (1949) (same); 1943 Mo. Laws 353, § 86 (same); RSMO § 1075 (1939)
(no mention of good cause); id. § 924 (1929) (same); id. § 1374 (1919) (same); id.
§ 1944 (1909) (same); id. § 737 (1899) (same); id. § 2177 (1889) (same); id. § 3644
(1879) (same); id. ch. 128, § 36 (1855) (same); 1849 Mo. Laws 98, § 3 (merger of
law and equity); RSMO ch. 136, § 7 (1845); id. art. IV, § 5 (1835); 1 TERR. LAWS
851, § 44 (1822) (on good and sufficient cause shown); id. at 111 (1807) (same).
Courts may order parties to permit inspection and copying of documents con-
taining evidence. RSMO § 510.030 (1959) (on good cause shown); id. § 510.030
(1949) (same); 1943 Mo. Laws 353, § 86 (same); RSMO § 1079 (1939) (no mention
of good cause); id. § 928 (1929) (same); id. § 1378 (1919) (same); id. § 1948 (1909)
(same); id. § 741 (1899) (same); id. § 2181 (1889) (same); id. § 3648 (1879)
(same); id. ch. 128, § 40 (1855) (same); 1849 Mo. Laws 98, § 2 (same).
On order of the court, a subpoena may command production of documentary
evidence on the taking of a deposition. RSMo § 492.280 (1959) (no mention of
good cause); id. § 492.280 (1949) (same); 1943 Mo. Laws 353, § 142 (same).
Although no statute explicitly required that matter sought be admissible
evidence, Missouri courts steadfastly implied such a requirement. See State ex rel.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Riederer, 303 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Mo. En Banc
1957); State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 365 Mo. 160, 164-65, 278 S.W.2d 737,
740-41 (En Banc 1955); Johnson v. Cox, 262 S.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Mo. 1953); State
ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 681-82, 203 S.W.2d
407, 410-11 (En Banc 1947); State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 180,
195 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (En Banc 1946); State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354
Mo. 719, 728, 190 S.W.2d 907, 912 (En Banc 1945); State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R.
v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 106, 27 S.W.2d 1027, 1028-29 (En Banc 1930); State ex rel.
Evans v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 142, 149 S.W. 473, 478 (En Banc 1912); State
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order. 46 During much of the state's history, good cause for production also
was required. 47 In this context, ruling that a litigant was entitled to pro-
duction or inspection of confidential documents authorized disclosure only
of documents that were important to the litigant's case. Today, the same
ruling has a far more sweeping effect.
Since Missouri's Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure became ef-
fective on April 1, 1960, documents sought need not be admissible in
evidence. 48 It is sufficient that they are "relevant" or appear "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '49 No court
order for discovery is required.50 Good cause for production need not be
shown. 51 To the extent the Von Hoffman Press decisions permit discovery
in this modem sense, they authorize a greater incursion into confidential
state files than any previous Missouri case. Caution should be exercised
before these holdings are extended beyond their facts.
In concluding that the policies underlying state confidentiality
statutes rarely justify withholding evidence necessary to a judicial pro-
ceeding, Millspaugh,5 2 French,53 Ross,5 4 andJones5 5 are persuasive. Ac-
quisition of a document in possession of the state may be essential to the
ascertainment of truth, and production when necessary is not likely to
jeopardize important state goals. An assertion that justice demands or
policy favors exposing confidential documents to the full scope of modern
discovery, however, is less persuasive. Permitting inspection of every docu-
ment that is relevant or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence in any litigated case would all but
ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 760 & n.4 (Mo. App., Spr. 1960); State
ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Craig, 329 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Mo. App., Spr. 1959); State ex
rel. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Southern, 284 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1955).
RSMo § 491.090 (1978) provides for summoning witnesses to testify and pro-
duce documents at trial. Although restrictions on documents discoverable before
trial have been relaxed considerably, a witness at trial still can be compelled to
produce only those documents that are admissible in evidence.
For a discussion of prestatutory discovery at common law and in equity, see 6
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1845-47, 1857-58 (rev. 1976). For a discussion of the
development of discovery in Missouri, see State ex rel. Schlueter Mfg. Co. v.
Beck, 337 Mo. 839, 846-50, 85 S.W.2d 1026, 1029-31 (En Banc 1935); Comment,
The Production and Inspection of Documents, Papers, and Tangible Things in
Missouri: A Comparison to the Federal Rules, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 413.
46. See note 45 supra.
47. See note 45 supra.
48. MO. R. CIV. P. 56.01.
49. Id.
50. Id. 56.01, 57.09, 58.01.
51. Id. 56.01, 57.09, 58.01.
52. 307 Mo. at 193, 270 S.W. at 112.
53. 315 Mo. at 83-84, 285 S.W. at 515-16.
54. 334 Mo. at 983-84, 69 S.W.2d at 665.
55. 252 S.W.2d at 663.
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eliminate any protection afforded personal information provided to the
state. At some point, the importance of a document to the proceeding or
the need for its discovery becomes sufficiently frail that the detriment of
disclosure outweighs the benefit of discovery.
None of the recent Missouri cases happily accommodates these policy
interests. Under the rule announced in Donelson, Missouri Revised
Statutes section 58.44956 precludes discovery of certain test results, no mat-
ter how vital to the ascertainment of truth or how minute the likelihood of
harm.57 Under the Von Hoffman Press holdings, in contrast, Missouri
Revised Statutes sections 32.05758 and 288.25059 constitute no bar to
discovery in certain cases. 60 Developing an approach that enables a ba-
lancing of policy interests in each case might produce more satisfactory
results.
Under Missouri's current rules of civil procedure, a certain balancing
of interests already is contemplated. Documents may be requested from
parties to an action under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 58.01. After such
discovery is requested, the party from whom it is requested or another par-
ty may petition the court for a protective order. 61 For good cause shown,
the court may make "any order which justice requires" to protect the party
from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense. '6 2 Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 57.09, subpoenas may be
issued to command production of documents by party and nonparty
witnesses at a deposition. On "motion made promptly and in any event at
or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith,"
the court may "quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or op-
pressive."63 While these rules may sufficiently balance the interests of most
litigants, they may be inadequate to protect the public interest in minimiz-
ing state disclosure of confidential information. When discovery is re-
quested from an officer of the state who is a party to the action, nonparties,
such as the twenty-three companies affected by Von Hoffman Press II,
have no standing to request protective orders. 64 When documents are sub-
poenaed for deposition, it is not clear whether nonparties who are not
served, such as the twenty-three companies affected by Von Hoffman
56. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
57. State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson, 557 S.W.2d at 710.
58. (Cum. Supp. 1980).
59. (Cum. Supp. 1980).
60. 607 S.W.2d at 222-23; 604 S.W.2d at 773.
61. MO. R. CIV. P. 56.01(c). Id. 58.01 authorizes one party to request
discovery from another party of documents that contain matters relevant to the
action or that appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Under id. 56.01, it is only the party from whom such discovery is sought
or another party who may petition the court for a protective order.
62. Id. 56.01(c).
63. Id. 57.09(b).
64. Id. 56.01(b), 58.01.
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Press I, have standing to file motions to quash. 65 In any event, there is no
assurance in the rules that parties or nonparties who are not direct recip-
ients of discovery requests will be notified in time to seek appropriate pro-
tection. 66 If discovery of confidential documents is governed solely by rules
of civil procedure, disclosure of nonpublic information will be left largely
to the discretion of state employees served with discovery requests. Under
the rules of discovery, the burden is always on those seeking protection to
convince the court discovery should be limited or denied. 67 Conscientious
as they may be, most state employees do not have the time or expertise re-
quired to champion the specialized interests of all persons providing per-
sonal information to the state.
A better policy balance might be achieved by imposing a good cause
requirement for discovery of confidential documents from the state.
Unless the party requesting discovery of a document convinces a court that
there is good cause for discovery of the document and good cause for its
discovery from the state, production should be denied. When a document
is important to a litigant's case, on the other hand, and unavailable from a
source other than the state, discovery should be allowed. Under this two-
tiered test of good cause, production of documents that are important to
judicial proceedings would not be impeded. 68 By obliging litigants to seek
documents from their source before approaching the state, the test would
also assure those who provide information to the state an opportunity to
defend requests for appropriate protective orders. Confidential state files
thereby would be opened far enough to serve the interests of justice, but
not so far as to allow unreasonable infringements on privacy or to deter
ready and truthful disclosure of information to the state.
MARIA W. CAMPBELL
65. Id. 57.09 provides for the issuance of subpoenas to compel the atten-
dance at depositions of party and nonparty witnesses. The rule further provides:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to pro-
duce the.., documents... designated therein; but the court, upon mo-
tion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in
the subpoena for compliance therewith, may ... quash or modify the
subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive.
Id. Under this rule, standing to file motions to quash is not expressly reserved to
deponents, and it is uncertain whether such a restriction would be implied. Clear-
ly, nondeponent parties have standing to petition for protective orders under id.
56.01, but whether nondeponent nonparties may file motions to quash under id.
57.09 is uncertain.
66. Id. 56.01, 57.09, 58.01.
67. Id. 56.01, 57.09.
68. Under this test, tax returns, for example, rarely would be discoverable
from the state. In most cases, they are freely discoverable from the filing in-
dividual or association. See State ex rel. Caloia v. Weinstein, 525 S.W.2d 779,
780 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757,
762-63 (Mo. App., Spr. 1960); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
856 [Vol. 46
13
Campbell: Campbell: Discovery of Confidential State Documents in Civil Proceedings
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
